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Even the longest journey starts with the first
step.
Chinese Proverb
Tanzania is attempting to achieve change by
deliberate policy, and to maintain order by
involving all the people in both the direction
and the process of change. We are under no
illusions about the difficulty of the task we have
undertaken. With few socialists we are trying
to build socialism; with few people conscious
of the basic requirements of democracy we are
trying to achieve change by democratic means;
with few technicians we are trying to effect a
fundamental transformation of our economy.
And with an educated elite whose whole
teaching encouraged motives of individualistic
advancement, we are trying to create an
egalitarian society.
Mwalirnu Julius K. Nyerere
While participating in the two seminars leading
to RwG, preparing the Tanzania country study
for it and reading the finished product, I found
two aspects of this strategy disturbing. First, it
appears to stress continuous, even, marginal change
gradually growing into structural transformation.
This simply does not address the question of
what type of political coalition in peripheral
economies either would wish to or would have the
ability to institute or maintain such a trans-
formation. I have therefore dealt here with
Tanzania's strategywhich is not primarily linear,
even, or marginal. Second, its political power
structure and base is neither homogenous nor as
fragile and narrow as is sometimes assumed. Both
the strategic thrust and the power base evolution
appear to be critical to Tanzania's adoption of
and persistence in a development dynamic in
many respects similar to that of RwG, albeit one
much more overtly centred on a transition to
socialism rather than a social democratic
approach.
Tanzania has attracted a great deal of
attention over the eight years since the Arusha
Declaration. It has been heralded as the precursor
of social democratic redistribution with growth
strategies, and written off as an example of
inefficient state capitalist intervention; hailed as
an example of transition to participatory
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socialism, and pilloried as another Kenya with a
thin rhetorical gloss. The reasons for this are not
hard to find. Tanzania's style of presentation and
action is unusual; despite repeated predictions (or
warnings from friends) of one type of collapse or
another, political and socio-economic change
appear to have gone forward and been coupled
with moderately rapid growth in output; and both
published data and opportunities for on-the-spot
contact are relatively goodespecially for a state
seeking radical change.
However, much of the interest has been from
particular perspectives, notably one seeking to
discover either the commentator's own utopia or
confirmation of his conviction that a social
democratic or socialist transition to development
is impossible; or one attempting to find a systemic
pattern of change broadly applicable elsewhere
on the periphery; or one dedicated to quarrying
examples to support policies or theories without
too much care to examine the context in which
they are embedded.
These approaches have certain limitations.
Tanzanians do not claim to have achieved their
goals but to be in the early stages of a long
transition, while individual policies and actions
mean very different things in different contexts
(e.g. wage control in Tanzania and in Singapore).
The 1967-75 trends in Tanzania are at least as
important for analysing the 1974-75 position and
venturing into projections of 1975-83 as are the
exact positions attained by the end of 1974, and
Tanzania's whole approach to development is
based on the belief that systems cannot be
imported and exported en bloc, but must be
analysed, adapted, modified, transformed and
internalized together with local ingredients. There-
fore, an evaluation of Tanzania in terms which
are not Tanzania-centred and particularly as an
'experiment' to apply elsewhere is, for many
purposes, inappropriate.
This set of notes attempts to consider the nature
of Tanzania's 1967-75 dynamic from a Tanzania-
centric position, and to offer a few reflections on
certain strategic elements and critical obstacles.
Because Tanzania's leadership views increases in
productive forces as critical means to attaining
socio-political and political economic ends, rather
than as overriding ends in themselves, the content
will stress political economic elements.
The following sketch pf 1961-73 development
achievements is necessarily brief and presupposes
some knowledge of Tanzania.'
The concentration on largely positive results is a
mix of a conclusion that on balance a dynamic
towards development, socialism, egalitarianism
and participation was achieved, and the needs
of brevity; it does not imply that no serious
secondary non-achievements and mistakes exist.
The ratio of top, public sector, pre-tax salaries
to minimum wages was reduced from 80 to 1 at
independence in 1961 to about 15 to 1 in mid-
1974, and the effective purchasing power ratio
from about 50 to 1 to under 10 to 1. A parallel
narrowing of differentials took place throughout
the wage and salary structure. Real purchasing
power at the top of the scales declined dramatic-
ally, and at the bottom and middle rose
significantly;
The widening f the differential between rural
and urban personal incomes in relative terms was
probably halted during the period 1967-72 (1973-
74 were drought years), and very large increases
in expenditure on rural services and rural invest-
ment probably led to a modest improvement in
the overall rural/urban balance over the same
period;
Recorded employment in urban areas after
1964 rose by 6-7 per cent a yeara rate roughly
comparable to that of urban population growth-
while minimum and middle wage purchasing
power was raised to levels estimated at minimum
decent family standards, and adjusted regularly;
The minimum wage appears to have had a
spill-over impact on the 'informal' sectorin
Dar es Salaam in 1971 about half this sector
apparently achieved minimum wage-earner pur-
chasing power;2
Ujamaa villageslargely drawn from the third
and fourth income quintiles of the peasant
populationgrew to about 30 per cent of the
peasant population (3 to 3.5 million) over 1967-73.
Their short-term output effects were largely
neutral because the supporting capital and services
provided were largely long-term in effect (e.g.
education) or not readily quantifiable because the
results would not be caught in GDP data (e.g.
pure water, health), or related to output gains
For a brief description see R. H. Green, 'Tanzania', in
Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al eds) OUP, 1974;
and for a fuller analysis R. H. Green, Toward Uansaa and
Kujitegemea: Income Distribution and Absolute Poverty
Eradication Aspects of the Tanzania Transition to Socialism,
IDS Discussion Paper no. 66, 1974. An interesting debate,
'Towards Socialism in Tanzaniaa Postcript', appears in
volume II of Socialism in Tanzania (Saul and Cliffe eds),
East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1973.2 See M. Bienefeld, 'The Informal Sector and Peripheral
Capitalism: the Case of Tanzania', IDS Bulletin, vol. 6 no. 3
and sources cited therein.
which are difficult to measure.(e.g. greater peasant
consumption from increysed subsistence
production);
Together with viliageization (1973-74) the
Ujamaa programme changed Tanzania's peasant
pattern from 15-20 per cent village/80-85 per cent
isolated homestead or hamlet in the middle l960s,
to 65-75 per cent village/25-35 per cent scattered
in 1975. The social and service provision results
were clear-cut; the production gains (via input
provision, dissemination of knowledge, infra-
structure, organization) were still basically poten-
tial; the initial 1974 moves were very badly
organized in some areas;3
Mass adult education grew over 1970-74 to
about 3.5 million enrolment, over half in post-
literacy applied courses;
Health facility allocation began a rapid shift
toward urban/rural balance over 197 1-73;
The proportion of high level jobs held by
Tanzanian citizens rose from about 10 per cent
(of 5,000) in 1961 to 50 per cent (of 10,000) in
1971, and above 67 per cent (of 12,000-12,500)
by 1975;
The share of the parastatals in the directly
productive sector rose by 1974 to about 80 per
cent of large and middle-sized businesses;4
li. The operating cash surplus of the public
directly-productive sector rose to about Sh600
million (6 per cent of total GDP or 8.5 per cent
of monetary GDP) by 1973;
Decentralizationaimed at greater efficiency
in the provision of services, development of
production and achievement of broad participa-
tion in decision taking/implementationwas
carried out for about half of government
activities and perhaps a quarter of parastatal
operations over 1971-74;
Workers Councils, Regional, District and
Ward Development Councils, and Ujamaa Village
Committees were created as avenues to participa-
tion with very uneven and somewhat slow results
over 1971-74. Almost all the appropriate bodies
existed by 1975. The problems lay in their general
lack of adequate assertiveness, weak conceptuali-
zation of roles and the dynamics of internal
decision-taking/power balance;5
3 cf. G. Hyden, Ujamaa, Villageization and Rural Development
in Tanzania', ODI Review, no. 1 1975; 'Unlucky Ujamaa',
Economist, 12 April 1975.
4 See R. H. Green, "Relevance, Efficiency, Romanticism and
Confusion in Tanzanian Planning and Management" in
A. H. Rweyemamu Public Sector Management Problems
in Africa, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala 1975 for
a more detailed presentation.
5 Resistance of managers and civil servants is a real obstacle,
but one whose significance turns on lack of assertion. Given
the political authority behind participation, passive resistance
is much easier to sustain than active confrontation in the face
of worker or peasant initiatives.
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Over 1964-73 real output Prose by. about 4.5
per cent a year (perhaps 2 per cent per capita).
somewhat above the African average and the
Tanzanian late colonial record (2.5 per cent) but
below strategic, as well as formal operating guide-
line, targets;
Over the same period agricultural output (and
its food subsector) grew by about 3 per cent a
yearslightly above the rate of population growth
but not enough to build a position of strength to
resist consecutive years of unfavourable weather
(e.g. 1973, 1974).
In fact, the 1961-73 period has two phases-
1961-67 and 196773.6 The former was more
Fabian, technocratic and mixed-economy
oriented, but apart from high-level manpower and
output, its direct contribution toward the results
noted above was either low or negative. Its
indirect contribution in demonstrating the need
for strategic shifts, and building up the personnel,
knowledge and institutional capacity for it, was
more positive. The period 1967-73 was character-
ized by a more radical, more political and more
socialist, strategy. Because this has increasingly
evolved in response to Tanzanian perceptions of
Tanzanian needs, with studies of foreign
approaches and imports of foreign knowledge
related to that perception, it is somewhat confus-
ing to the observer, for the process is more
Marxian than the terminology; the degress of
discipline imposed rather greater than is super-
ficially evident; and the experimentation with a
wide range of knowledge/institutional/procedural
imports rather more a deliberate policy than
random pragmatism or absent-minded 'neutrality'.
* * *
One special characteristic of the Tanzanian
strategy of transition has been to use crises to
push ahead on basic objectives while at the same
time introducing unpopular reforms needed even
in the absence of the crisis. In 1971 the problems
posed by the rise of the right-wing populist regime
in Uganda were the occasion for a clarification,
reassertion, and deepening emphasis on participa-
tion, egalitarianism, and rural-oriented develop-
ment. The problems of the State Trading
Corporation in that year were seized upon to
provide the springboard for the total reform and
decentralization of the import-export-wholesale
commercial sector, and the foreign exchange crisis
for an assertion of much more effective strategic
control over parastatals, bank credit, imports, and
the allocation of surplus from the productive
sector. The 1973 devaluation was made the
occasion for a tough price-control system, which
6 For a fuller discussion of 1961-67 see K. Ngombale-Mwiru,
"The Arusha Declaration", and A. de la Rue, "Ujama on the
March" in, Socialism in Tanzania, op. cit.
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in legislative direction and practice was concerned
with firm efficiency and the protection of key
investible surpluses as well as commercial margins
and consumer welfare.
This approach has been put to a severe test over
1974-75. Grain price increases, the failure of the
1973-74 short rains crop and a very poor harvest
on the 1974 long rains crop, and oil price increases
trimmed probable effective national purchasing
power for 1974 by at least 10 per cent between
Christmas 1973 and June 1974. Forceful argu-
ments were advanced for 'muddling through' and
massive retrenchment. The first was rejected as
imprudent and the second as suicidal, because it
would probably reverse the development dynamic,
undermine political solidarity and worsen the
production gap (in food and basic consumer
goods) which was the basis of the crisis.
The actual strategy elaborated over April-
October 1974 included:
Raising minimum and middle wages enough to
protect real purchasing power and increasing
salaries by a significant amount (5-15 per cent),
though not one which protected all income levels
from the price increases;
Raising prices to avoid random subsidies and
to preserve the bulk of investible surpluses (with
the exception of grain until October, when the
extent of import volumes and prices forced a
deliberate interim subsidy to be abandoned);
Boosting producer prices to import parity (over
1971-73 they had fallen below this level for the
first sustained period since the 1950s) and stepping
up input provision (largely seed, fertilizer,
pesticide);
Speeding rural transformation to seek patterns
more conducive to providing know-how, educa-
tion, inputs, transport, marketing and, more
immediately, food relief (probably about 200,000
t.orines);
Concentrating more investment on productive
sector projects with an immediate emphasis on
mass market items including textiles, garments,
cement, steel products and the pre-export pro-
cessing of primary products, e.g. cotton, cashew,
hides and skins, sisal;
Launching a major emergency assistance
campaign to secure foreign resources to cover very
large (1974-75) and smaller projected (1975-76 and
1976-77) interim resource gaps until better weather
and the pay-off on production-increasing policies
would restore a balance.
This strategic package was fairly clearly presented
in the 1974-75 Budget Speech andin partin
7 For a somewhat fuller account see R. H. Green, "Aspects of
World Monetary and Resource Transfer System in 1974; A
View from the Extreme Periphery" in G. K. Helleiner
A World Divided, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
the earlier and later announcements of the imple-
mentation of some of its components. It may not
succeedalthough, with success assured for
interim external finance raising, and reasonable
1975 main crops, total failure now seems most
unlikely. What it clearly does demonstrate is a
belief on the part of the leadership that either
slamming on the brakes or going into reverse
would entail strains the Tanzanian transition
could not survive; and that meeting crises could
be used to refine the more positive elements of
government strategy. It also demonstrates a
capacity for a coherent and rapid response to
mai or exogenous shocks and, on the part of the
country as a whole, a very considerable willing-
ness to take and stick to tough action, combined
with a commitment to lay as little as possible of
the burden on the weakest sections of the
population.
* *
Certain elements of the Tanzanian transition
strategy and political base are of greater signifi-
cance than the attention usually paid to them
would suggest. The strategy has normally been
seen as uneven and somewhat erratically articu-
lated central planning, dominated by European
social democratic or technocratic elements. The
political base has either been treated as self
evidently the urban and rural poor (without much
analysis), or seen as the bureaucratic-managerial
and rural elites and, therefore, inherently contra-
dictory to stated policies. None of these explana-
tions is very satisfactory.
Tanzania's major political economic and socio-
economic decisions are taken politically, not
technically. In a majority of cases a large number
of technical inputs, and a large sample of peasant
and worker opinion, have been collected by the
TANU Central Committee, the President and/or
the Cabinet before the decision is taken. In almost
all cases the details of implementation (subject to
a check that they do implement, and not reverse
the decision) have been formulated in processes
involving managers and planners, but after the
basic decision has been reached.
Decisions taken in response to technical proposals
have increasingly been consolidating steps to reap
the benefits from, or adjust the detailed course of,
major decisions or stop-gap measures to avoid
serious problems until a major decision could be
taken. These are marginal or incremental rather
than structural or direction-changing, e.g. the
April 1974 wage-salary-price package did flow
directly from initial technical proposals, but the
broader 1965-67 set of political decisions, deter-
mining the course toward creating an egalitarian
income allocation framework, emanated from the
President.
The political strategy has consistently turned on
identifying a limited number of important and
urgent problems (immediate contradictions)
involving broad structural decisions aimed at
creating a new base for development (inter-
mediate synthesis), and following through by
concentrating resources and technical attention
on achieving and consolidating the potential gains
from the structurai changes. This strategy quite
explicitly denies either that incrementalism can
be an adequate overall approach, or that one can
advance equally on all fronts at once. It is not
linear. The number of structural changes which
can be carried out at once are limited by political,
technical and real resource constraints, and by the
general social, political and external environments.
Even had it not been transformed into something
else by IBRD technicians, the President's 1962
village proposals could not then have formed the
basis for a structural shift to Ujamaa villages
(1969) or total villageization (1974-). The Arusha
Declaration (1967) and its initial implementation
in respect of ownership, management, equality and
mass education were preconditions for the
strategic decisions at political level of 1968 and
1973 to be operational. Similarly, the move to a
dominantly public directly-productive sector,
decided in the Arusha Declaration, would not
have been possible in 1961 given the capacity of
citizen manpower, nor would it have been possible
had 1961-66 trends to greater inequality, more
foreign firm-Tänzanian manager links and the
emergence of a citizen political-capitalist coalition
been allowed to continue until 1971.8
The political choice of areas for structural change
and of their sequence, backed by technical inputs,
is not particularly consistent with either standard
socialist European models of central planning-
as usually taught at any rateor with Western
academic planning strategies, which have a
tendency to confuse the neat linear world of some
branches of mathematics with the rather different
world of political economy. The process does look
messy, does involve changes of direction, does
lead to at least marginal waste and failure to
articulate, and does put very heavy and new
pressures on technical personnel. However, the
alternative of incrementalism on the eve of the
Arusha Declaration would have meant a steadily
increasing divergence from the goals of egali-
tarianism, participation, and national self-reliance.
8 It is not intended to imply that the entire strategic sequence
was seen clearly from the start. The basic goals and some
intermediate positions were, but other developments resulted
from growing experience and response to external challenges.
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Equally, a broad front approach, seeking public
directly-productive sector dominance in 1962 and
embarking on the 1969 and 1974 Ujamaa and
Development Villages and the 1967 decision on
income allocation frameworks at that date, would
have resulted in virtually immediate technical and
political collapse. These would have been much
less efficient results than those actually achieved.
The political base issue is equally complex and
also closely related. TANU is a mass party with
a majority of poor peasant and worker members
and a socialist majority in its central leadership.
It is national and does possess considerable-
albeit uneventwo-way communication, organiza-
tion and implementation capcity at levels from
10-House Cells upward.9 On the other hand, its
strengthwhile growingis not massive in
absolute terms and its local leadershipalbeit
decreasinglyis often both overly authoritarian
and derived from proto-rural elite groups. Its
total dominance turns on the absence of any
alternative political coalition or, indeed, any
locally articulated ideology around which to
build one.
High-level manpower is critical to the articulation
and implementation of political decisions. A
hostile managerial-civil service grouping could
block, and a passively demoralised one slow,
action. Without an alternative political coalition
this group could hardly change the government
nor, so long as the latter remains intellectually
and politically self-confident, its strategy. In
practice the Tanzanian public sector elite has
accepted severe cuts in its relative and actual
standard of living, while morale and efficiency
(while uneven) have improved since independence,
since Arusha and (after a setback in 197 1-72) over
the past two years. Internalization of the ideology
of transition to socialism is incomplete, and
transition to participation still more so, but
progress is neither negligible nor static.10 A
majority do fit Amilcar Cabral's definition of a
'revolutionary petty bourgeoisie':1'
"in spite of all hostile conditions it remains
identified with the fundamental interests of the
9 TANU technocratic capacity has been kept low deliberately.
Its political role was seen as likely to be weakened, not
enhanced, if it came to have a parallel technocratic bureau-
cracy and to argue technical policy details rather than set
frameworks for policy and criticize results in the context
of these political terms of reference. This may be a wrong
decision; it is not absent-mindedness or bureaucratic sabotage,
as some critics have implied.
10 I. Shivje (in Socialism in Tanzania, op. cit.) greatly over-
emphasizes the power of this proto-class. Almost all of his
examples relate to a limited group of individuals in one
institution; his sources were managers and civil servants
who opposed them; his targets were already the objects of
civil service and political criticism, and have almost all been
demoted or transferred to less critical positions.
li Brief Analysis of the Social Structure of Guinea.' Revolution
in Guinea, London, 1969.
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popular masses. To do this it may have to
commit suicide, but . . . by sacrificing itself it
can reincarnate itself in the conditions of
workers and peasants".
The lower rural civil service cadres and the proto-
rural elites pose more serious potential challenges.
They are far less ready to transform themselves
the lower civil servants because all they perceive
themselves as possessing is the power to give orders
to the masses, and the proto-kulak and proto-
merchant elite because all they have is an income
higher than their fellow peasants and the ability
to influence local officials.'2 Here, if anywhere, is
the foundation for a political counter-coalition.
But it is more a foundation for delay and
scattered resistance than for counter-revolution.
The African rural proto-kulak and proto-
merchant groups can hardly number more than
50,000 households out of over 2 million; the very
hierarchical orientation of the civil servants makes
them at least partially responsive to national Party
and government ideology and policy; neither
group is nationally organised.'3 Successive
centrally mobilized campaigns have removed or
weakened many bourgeois local TANU leaders;
Ujamaa has tended to isolate some proto-kulaks,
remove others from the land, and incorporate the
remainder in villages (albeit sometimes at the
price of their having considerable influence within
them). Decentralization has made local mass
participation possibleand less often, but to a
growing extent, has led to it in practiceand has
moved many more ideologically committed and
highly qualified officials, who do not see them-
selves as personally threatened by participation,
into the regions and districts. Villageization
(replacing what until 1967 was an 80-85 per cent
scattered household pattern) will further reduce
the rural elite's powers of inertia, which the
massive rural adult education programme (3.5
million listed enrolment, or about 25 per cent of
the population in 1974-75) is likely to have an
even greater positive transforming power. The
main body of the Tanzanian peasants has
included, and still includes, TANU's loyalest
supporters: the basic problems are to provide
education and ideology to increase their
participatory initiative, organizational capacity,
and productive achievements.
12 cf. J. R. Finacune, Rural Development and Bureaucracy in
Tanzania, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala,
1974, for a forcefulif perhaps over static and thus pessi-
misticaccount of the interaction in the Mwanza Region.
Mwanza is one of the four regions (Kilimanjaro, Arusha,
Iringa are the other three) with the most proto-kulak
stratification.
13 The Co-operative Union of Tanzania is a potential focus.
In practice it is rather weak and has steadily lost influence.
Some regional unions have been more effective rural elite
bases of power and arenas of attempts to reduce that
power.
Organized labour in Tanzania (about 500,000) is
very much integrated into TANU organization.
ally. Because egalitarianism has meant the growth
of purchasing power for minimum and middle-
wage earners, and even the first steps toward
worker participation and mass adult education
have increased human dignity and status,
organized workers accept the Party's basic
ideology and the government's basic policies.
Differences have been occasional and relatively
low key (compared, say, with the United
Kingdom). The National Union of Tanzanian
Workers (NUTA) is not perhaps very efficient
either at building worker participation or present-
ing worker needs very clearly and cogently,14
but it is a part of the ruling coalition both now
and in the foreseeable future, and in that respect
does represent the vast majority of its members.
The informal sector15 poses problems. Tanzania's
leadership is committed to preventing the emer-
gence of a medium or large-scale African private
sector. In the absence of such a sector it sees the
possibility of utilizing the resident Asian and
foreign capitalist sectors during the transition,
because these can be cut off from any local
business/civil service alliances. The small-scale
African proto-capitalist sector cannot, therefore,
be allowed to expand dramatically either in unit
size or sectoral importance.
Whether to provide some assistance, or at any
rate channel some purchases to the informal
sector is debated. The Workers and Peasants
Housing Fund set up channels designed to allow
workers to use informal sector contractors who
are cheaper and quicker; the Small Industries
Development Organization is not strictly limited
to regional, district and workers' co-operative
unit support. One reason for this somewhat
ambivalent attitude (and for the much slower
phasing out of middle and small Asian business-
men than in Kenya) is the problems confronting
building up small-scale public sector units.
Decentralization to regional, district and co-
operative level in trade, transport, repair services
and simple manufacturing has begun, but is not
seen as achieving major breakthroughs, at least
in the last two areas, until the 1980s. In the
14 Apparently the 1974 wages/prices package, like its 1969
and 1972 predecessors, was formulated as a Treasury
proposal much more in response to overall TANU goals
and their interaction with resource possibilities than on the
basis of specific NUTA proposals. Indeed, there is a certain
irony in the abnormally low level of broad participation in
formulating the main 1969-74 tax, price, wage policy instru-
ments designed and used to promote egalitarianism. The
framework was the Party's and the President's but the
responsewhile clearly enthusiastic and relevant.does not
seem to have been informed by very broad consultation or
opinion collection.
15 cf. Bienefeld, op. cit.
meantime, the informal sector is needed and half
encouraged, but also seen as a potential danger
if allowed to develop into a capitalist class.
* * *
The continuation of Tanzania's transition to
decentralized, participatory, egalitarian socialist
developmnt faces major obstacles. Margins for
error are very low in terms of productive forces,
institutional capacity, and high level manpower.
The ability to make and to recover from serious
errors is available only to middle and high-income
countries, or to those with high levels of centrally-
controlled coercive forces. At the same time,
exogenous forces place the implementation of
national decisions at far greater risk than in
larger, less externally dependent, and/or less poor
countries. For example, the cost of the 1973-74
drought, grain price rises over 1972-73 and the
oil price escalation over 1973-74 represented a
loss of at least 10 per cent in real purchasing
power of national output in 1974.
Because the success of the transition rests on
continued progress requiring a series of structural
changes, marginal errors are inevitable and major
ones difficult to avoid, with the implied corollary
that corrective action must be rapid and rapidly
effective, despite the limitations of data, and of
human, institutional and communication capacity
for learning about and identifying errors or
formulating and implementing responses.
The degree of shared national purpose and of self
discipline achieved to date is uneven. Compared
to most peripheral economic units it is high and
growing, but compared with either a Scandinavian
country or China it remains low. In the absence
of decisive coercive force available to the govern-
ment, and the presence of a commitment to
broadening participation, the raising of the levels
of perceived national purpose and self-discipline
is a critical strategic requirement, and the present
levels a significant constraint.
The balance between the minimum rate of
progress necessary to prevent a reversal of the
dynamic of transition and the maximum rate
objectively possible (for political as well as
material and human resource reasons) is a very
fine one. The selection, timing and sequence of
structural changes is critical, as is the adequate
consolidation of the potential gains from
structural changes which will, in the absence of
consolidation, slip backward from reality to
rhetoric.
The tension between broadening informed parti-
cipation through education and ideology, and
imposing change on a Platonic guardianship model
is extremely severeespecially in the case of
radical intellectuals and technicians who appear
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to have less historical perspective and human
contact with mass individuals than the dominant
radical politicians and managers. Laissez faire will
not bring systemic change; centralized dirigisme
will not create participatory, egalitarian socialism,
liberating workers and peasants. The intermediate
syntheses, temporarily resolving aspects of this
contradiction, are partial, unsatisfactory and
subject to changenot because the ones chosen
are usually unsound, but because of the inherent
nature of the tension.16
These are not obstacles unique to Tanzania. They
are almost certain to confront any sustained effort
to achieve a transition either to participatory
socialist development or to a social-democratic
variant of redistribution with growth. A number
of them would appear in quite different form for
a coalition seeking to achieve or consolidate power
to institute such a transition, or for a ruling
coalition seeking a quite different pattern of
growth, stability and/or development. The
obstacles are dominantly political, economic and
socio-economic; the augmentation and allocation
of productive capacity and material resources are
critical elements in, and constraints on, transition
to development, but by no means the only ones,
nor even, in each individual instance, the most
important ones.
On the face of it the list of obstacles might suggest
either that Tanzania's transition cannot continue,
or that it is the result of some fortuitous accident
and cannot be repeated. That is probably too
facile a conclusion. Tanzania has managed to
balance the necessary and the possible for over
13 years while building up an increasingly clear
development strategy and dynamic, and has done
so despite (indeed in part in the process of)
meeting several serious crises. If a description of
Tanzania as it is in 1975 had been offered as a
projection in the months immediately before or
after the Arusha Declaration it would (quite
rightly perhaps) have been rejected as impossible.
A serious internal misjudgment and/or a con-
catenation of exogenous events could have
destroyedand could still destroyTanzania's
development dynamic. EcQnomically, socially and
politically, Tanzania is very small, has limited
resilience and is therefore fragile. However,
collapse is rather less likely today than in 1968.
Equally, a quiet sliding back into a more
heirarchical, elite-oriented pattern has become
16 The same type of successive contradictions with successive
partial synthesis requiring amendment and re-balancing in a
zigzag advance is very evident in the cases of China and of
Yugoslavia. To a lesser degree (partly because of limitsposed by actual or potential external intervention) they can
be fairly readily identified in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland.
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steadily less probable from 1967 onwardthe
opposite forces have built up a history, a dynamic
and a sense of victory.
Clearly Tanzania is unique and the Tanzanian
transition cannot be an export-oriented industry.
These are rather trivial propositions because no
two states, no two governing coalitions (or their
means of securing and consolidating power), and
thereforeno two transitions to development
are identical. However, if Tanzania is today
radically atypical of the smallest, poorest states
this is a result, much more than a cause, of the
road it took from 1961-75. The present nature of
Tanzania's ruling coalition and of the organized
(or quasi-organized) forces behind it is not what
it was 13 years ago, any more than levels and
targets of income distribution, external dependency
or productive forces have remained unchanged.
This suggests that the broad pattern of the
Tanzanian transition is of interest to any group
seeking to begin .or continue a rapid, but basically
non-violent, transition to egalitarian, participatory
socialism (or perhaps to the social-democratic
variant of redistribution with growth). 'While part
of the pattern would be irrelevant to a political
coalition achieving power by armed revolution
(e.g. Mozambique) a number of elements would
not: a revolution does not create a tabula rasa
with all internal and external constraints removed,
nor permit totally direct and linear sequences.'7
Picking out particular programmes or policies to
drop into quite different political economic and
socio-economic contexts and dynamics is another
matter. A few might be transplantablee.g. in the
directly-productive public enterprise sector; others
would either wither and die or be transformed in
rather odd wayscontrast mass rural education
in Tanzania and in Kenya;'8 and someif really
implementedwould be quite unexpectedly
explosivee.g. the combined tax-salary-wage
policy. This conclusion is not surpising in the
context of Tanzania. One aspect of Tanzanian
self-reliance has been a growing conviction that
neither random selection of policies-programmes-
techniques from quite disparate systems, nor
attempts to import large chunks of foreign
systems, was either possible or desirable without
systematic prior study by Tanzanians of the
Tanzanian context, and resultant rejection or
modification of the imports, combined with the
development of Tanzania's own knowledge and
its capacity to apply it.
17 The obvious example is Chinasee the paper in this issue
by John Gittings.
18 See for example the articles by Martin Godfrey and G.C.M.
Mutiso and by Budd Hall in IDS Bulletin vol. 6 no. 3.
